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This article, based on data collected from a year-long study, investigates the 
evaluation of a UK local government policy implementation and  the use of 
evaluation data as an evidence base for public policy (McCoy and Hargie, 2001; 
Schofield, 2004; Bovaird and Loeffler, 2007; Stern, 2008).  Our case study highlights 
a number of issues.  First, uncertainty and ambiguity of policy direction can lead to 
barriers in establishing clear evaluation goals, which, second, results in frustration 
among stakeholders at a perceived disparity between what we term problem-inspired 
policy and problem-solving policy. Finally, this perception can be compounded by a 
lack of consideration for local variations of, for example, specific cultures, 
geographies or historical contexts. I responding to these problems our article argues 
that regardless of where policy control and decision-making occurs, the importance 
of the experiences of implementers of policy at a local level (where 
subject/geographical/cultural specialism and familiarisation exists) is crucial.  
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There is nothing a government hates more than to be well-informed; for it makes the 




This article investigates an evaluation of a local government implementation in the 
North East of England. Drawing upon data from a year-long ethnographic study it 
seeks to highlight a number of issues surrounding policy development and local 
policy implementation, including: the disparity between central guidance and local 
implementation; perceptions of data as policy evidence; and the utilisation of 
evaluation data as evidence to inform policy design. 
 
The study highlights a number of key features concerning evaluation as an evidence-
base. First, ambiguous policy direction can obstruct the setting of well-defined 
evaluation goals, resulting in frustration among stakeholders. Second, this frustration 
can manifest itself as a perceived disparity between what we term ‘problem-inspired 
policy’ and ‘problem-solving policy’ approaches. Finally, problems can be 
compounded by a lack of consideration of local variations in terms of specific 
cultural, geographic and historical contexts.  
 
In highlighting these issues, this paper echoes Stern’s (2008:250) argument that 
evaluators recognise 'policy debates and the world of policy-makers' and confirms 
that there is a great potential for influences, political or otherwise, to impinge on 




policy development and implementation. Evaluation needs to be sensitive to such 
influences and the disparate perspectives of policy-makers and policy-implementers; 
regardless of where policy control and decision-making occurs, the importance of the 
experiences of implementers of policy at a local level (where subject/ geographical/ 
cultural specialism and familiarisation exists) is crucial. 
  
 
The rise of evaluation 
 
Evaluation studies have long been given prominence in determining the 
effectiveness of policies and programmes (Barbier, 1999; Bovaird and Loeffler, 
2007), attracting ‘increasing attention from researchers, policy-makers and theorists’ 
(McCoy and Hargie, 2001:325). This evidence is required: 
 
to tell us what works and why, and what types of policy initiatives are likely to be most 
effective (and)...must vastly improve the quality and sensitivity of the complex and often 
constrained decisions we, as politicians, have to make (DfEE, 2000:24,25)  
 
Sadly, as we argue, the detail of why a policy initiative is successful or not is often 
not always gained due to the type of data requested for national evaluation 
purposes. Nonetheless, almost a decade ago Davies (1999:150) noted ‘the 
widespread expectation that policy and resource allocation decisions be based on 
sound information about the performance of public programmes’, an argument that 
has been consistently reconfirmed since (for example see McCoy and Hargie, 2001; 
Schofield, 2004; Stern, 2008). Several government publications also sustain this 
point (Cabinet Office, 1999a, 1999b, 2000). The attempt at public service 




modernisation, intended to provide a more responsive, efficient and strategic 
provision (Cabinet Office, 1999), reaffirmed further a renewed emphasis on 
evidence-based policy paradigms (Shaw, 1999). The development and rise of 
evaluation to fill this need was therefore a logical response, and despite a lack of 
evidence demonstrating policy effectiveness, Albaek (1995) argues that the use of 
evaluation data is increasing. Rational models of policy fulfilment see evaluation as a 
tool for determining whether policies or programmes have met their objectives 
(Sanderson, 2000) clearly a task capable of satisfying numerous stakeholders when 
assuming that all are agreeable to the policy and programmes objectives and 
targets.  
 
One immediate issue is that, as Biott and Cook (2000:410) argue, although ‘a range 
of data sources’ are invited at local levels (perhaps to demonstrate engagement), in 
practice national solutions/frameworks have usually predetermined. With numerous 
purposes for evaluation, a further local-national dichotomy emerges with local 
evaluation implementation argued to be for learning and formative purposes, whilst 
evaluation nationally concerned with accountability (Martin and Sanderson, 1999). 
Martin and Sanderson’s argument that ‘what matters is what works’ (1999 in 
Sanderson, 2000:433) echoed New Labour’s 1997 manifesto pledge, which was 
itself a cornerstone for the alleged development of evidence-based policy. There is 
also suggestion that local evaluators may encounter issues around control at a 
national level, another phenomenon that can be mirrored in our policy-related 
findings and a concern conveyed through this paper (Biott and Cook, 2000; 
Grimshaw and Stewart, 1999). In her study of the ‘LEADER’ community initiative, 
Saraceno (1999) made clear that issues existed between national and local policy, 




and evaluation; and also noted significant differences in evaluation approaches at 
national and local levels which make comparability difficult. 
 
Our case study demonstrates all of these issues and more, particularly including 
timing issues, varying stakeholder interests and an overreliance on quantitative 
measurement.  Fundamentally, however, it reveals a central-local tension that 
informs the way that implementation evaluations are strategically viewed. 
 
The evaluation case study 
 
This paper is based on an ongoing evaluation programme that the authors are 
currently undertaking. The evaluation is being conducted on a three-year local 
economic development programme, funded centrally by the Department of 
Communities and Local Government and implemented by an English local authority.  
 
Nationally, there are twenty such programmes, worth around £300 million 
collectively, and intended to develop sustainable economic growth in under-
developed and deprived areas; in some cases neighbouring local authorities have 
united to deliver joint programmes in their areas. The case programme began in 
2007 and is due to end in 2010 (although this has been subject to much change), the 
programme attempts to kick-start enterprise by encouraging new business start-ups, 
as well as aiming to help existing businesses grow. As previously stated, the authors 
are providing the local evaluation for the case study programme. 
 




Each local authority (or partnership) was free to choose its own pattern of delivery 
and evaluation. With a lack of national evaluation direction in the first 18-months of 
funding release, local evaluation activity was uncertain and many programmes chose 
to perform more of an output-driven quantitative performance measurement strategy 
than formative evaluation activity pending further guidance, such a delay was also 
seen by Biott and Cook (2000) with a 12 month gap between local and national 
evaluation initiation. However, within the case programme an evaluation strategy 
was devised, agreed and began to be delivered, despite this lack of national activity.  
 
The evaluation strategy was designed by the authors of this article, and contained 
two components; a qualitative element and an objective-based quantitative 
framework reflecting the specific objectives highlighted by the case authority: 
occupational segregation; environmental regeneration; and, business activity 
adversities (such as failure rates) were included. Initially, programme delivery sought 
to subdivide the programme into six projects each concentrating on a specific 
economic issue, this was adjusted as the programme progressed although was 
limited by the proposal on which funding was released. The beneficiaries of the 
projects exhibited considerable diversity in terms of their social, economic and 
demographic status, which led to significant discrepancies in modes of both 
programme and evaluation delivery and monitoring. To an extent therefore a flexible 
delivery approach was required to adjust to the contextual demand although this was 
done with some hesitation by the programme implementers who felt confined by 
national guidelines and chance of reprisals for such changes 
 




In one sense, flexible delivery can be beneficial, providing bespoke and geocentric 
interventions to communities but can have negative consequences for evaluation. 
Data is more difficult to initially capture, for example, which in turn provides obstacles 
for measurement, communication and replication in future programmes. In addition, 
there is the ever present spectre of generalisability and transferability: there is no 
guarantee that one successful project could work in a different context. It also 
appears that this degree of flexibility will diminish with the late establishment of the 
national evaluation (a point also noted by Biott & Cook in their study of Early Years 
Excellence Centres).  
 
The existence of both national and local evaluations within this programme fit with 
Allen and Black’s (2006) notion of ‘dual-level’ evaluations, ‘dual’ being used to refer 
to the existence of both national and local level evaluations. As mentioned 
previously, with this bringing inherent issues such as control, purpose and flexibility.  
 
Evaluating local implementation 
 
As previously stated, programme evaluation findings and the impact of interventions 
may not materialise for many years, or even decades and therefore ‘what works’ is 
often an unknown quantity simply because policy initiatives are not given sufficient 
time to be evaluated properly. This problem of quick policy turnover was an 
immediate issue to the case evaluation.  Although ostensibly it aimed towards a 
long-term, cultural transformation in an economically and socially disadvantaged 
area, the reality was based on immediate results. A vignette from the field-notes 
journal maintained throughout the study states: 





“The work of the programme team in schools appears greatly in line with the programme aims 
and objectives, and meets some of the outputs desired by the Local Authority and nationally. 
However, the real outcomes won’t be seen for a long-time – have the interventions had an 
effect in 6 years time when primary school age students decide which path they choose – 
further education, work, to be self-employed, or if unsuccessful to continue to what is now 
third generation unemployment for many?...by this time the programme and I (the evaluator) 
will be gone, a new programme will have been funded, and little regard will be paid to the 
good (or bad) outcomes that are beginning to fruit from this historic effort” (Extract from 
Fieldnotes Journal, 12 June 2008) 
 
This policy included interventions aimed to transform the attitudes of individuals who 
have encountered two generations of unemployment within their families; yet 
evaluation data only considers the three-year life of the programme and is therefore 
significantly short against the potential time span for these interventions to 
materialise. Sabatier (1986) describes this as ‘premature assessment’ and 
subsequently calls for process evaluation that looks more specifically at the actual 
implementation of policy rather than just what outcomes or achievements are 
produced. To complicate this issue further ongoing deliberations over programme 
length, and whether or not programmes should actually be retracted, suggest that 
rather than extend programmes (which would allow for longer and more 
comprehensive evaluation studies) there is a prevalence to adopt a quick-win, or 
abandonment strategy, in the UK economic policy arena.  
 
The effectiveness of the latest programmes which replicate the intentions of 
programmes before it, must therefore be questioned, given that the evaluation 




results of expiring programmes are often not even published by the time the new 
programmes are implemented: 
 
In several recent cases (e.g. the Employment New Deals and Best Value in local government) 
the UK government has proceeded with policy commitments even though evaluation evidence 
from pilots has not demonstrated whether they work (Sanderson, 2000:448) 
 
Subsequently, data is neither reviewed nor considered as evidence in the design of 
these substitutions (Pawson and Tilley, 1997; Sanderson, 2000); when evaluation 
data is reviewed for use in future programmes, the key points that the evidenced 
programme sought to address may no longer be relevant to the current context – 
highlighting expiration and generalisation risks.  
 
It is also worth considering the overreliance on quantitative data in policy evaluation 
(at the request of national government office). This quantitative emphasis has 
received much criticism and calls over the years from evaluation theorists 
encouraging a move away from positivism to a more process-driven approach 
(Pawson and Tilley, 1997; Sabatier, 1986): 
 
Many activities in the public policy realm, by their very nature, are complex and intangible and 
cannot be reduced to a numerical figure (Perrin, 1999 cited in Davies, 1999:155) 
 
At first glance, for example, the quantitative indicators requested by local and central 
government would make our case study appear to be failing and even accelerating 
some adverse business scenarios such as survival rate, growth rate and 
employment.    This would be unfair, if not wrong: the effects of the economic 




downturn on these factors, however, have not even been considered as a 
contributory factor.  Quantitative measures alone, therefore, do not tell the whole 
story. In contrast, a qualitative reflection finds that the programme has sufficiently 
accommodated its target groups by providing a comprehensive delivery strategy, 
aligned with other key support providers and which sees many business-based 
stakeholders being saved, strengthened or started. Again relating to good timing, this 
qualitative perspective requires the patience of policy-makers to allow qualitative 
evaluation research to be conducted and presented. Qualitative data allows a 
formative evaluation to contribute to programme delivery (Tessmer, 1993) a feature 
which quantitative, experimental evaluation design cannot offer. It is our belief that 
the quantitative nature of information required to form evidence within this case study 
stands as a barrier promoting, most simply, the identification of whether the 
programme works through these specified outputs but requiring very little rich detail 
to describe the processes integral to that success. This shortcoming is very much 
like collecting the ingredients required for a recipe but failing to gain the instructions 
on how these go together to create a successful, replicable product. The qualitative 
efforts of the local evaluation in this case programme are of no interest to the 
national evaluation efforts, despite their overwhelming ability to informing policy-
makers of the successful processes implemented in this programme locally. The 
complex nature of the case programme also lends itself to a more qualitative 
approach (although that is not to say that a triangulated approach encapsulating both 
qualitative and quantitative data is less adequate).  
 




Ultimately, policy is misinformed by these timing and methodological points leading 
to a seemingly futile evaluation effort, and reaffirming critics who question the 
political motivations for evaluation for accountability rather than learning purposes.  
 
In addition, there is the rather context-dependent judgement of ‘what works’? What is 
important (and relevant) to one group of stakeholders may compete with the 
interests of another group. This phenomenon was evident in the evaluation case 
study where there were several notable attempts by various stakeholders to 
influence the nature and purpose of the intended evaluation. Some, for example, 
wanted the evaluation to inform learning; others merely for auditing and 
accountability purposes; whilst some stakeholders saw its existence for no other 
reason than to check the box to say an evaluation had been done. The clash of 
interests seems to follow on from the way in which such programmes are initially 
implemented:  
 
Most policy evaluations are commissioned by government departments and agencies and 
publicly-funded bodies accountable to them for the effective development and implementation 
of the policy. This has given a strong top-down orientation to evaluation with a major concern 
to promote accountability and control. (Sanderson, 2000:438) 
 
Accountability and control, while crucial, potentially promote a competition of 
interests at the local level. Within the case programme, the interactions between 
policy-implementers and potential beneficiaries led to an interest in the optimal 
development of the programme to best serve these intended beneficiaries 
(attachment to programme participants morally and emotionally may perhaps feature 
within this interest). On-the-other-hand, local authority managers, as the accountable 




body pressured the implementers to remain objective, focusing solely on those 
outcomes that influenced the indicators specified. Whose interests should be 
considered and prioritised for delivery and evaluation purposes in this case? - The 
potential beneficiaries, programme-implementers, Central Government and 
accountable body (in our case the local government authority) all have specific, yet 
varied, interests in the policy’s implementation. Even those who benefit from the 
programme may have competing views of what actually works; primary data from the 
case evaluation clearly demonstrates a broad spectrum of opinions as to the 
success of the programme so far. Small and new start-up businesses (particularly 
those in the creative industries), for example, have welcomed the inclusion of action-
learning and networking sets as part of the evaluation method, whereas medium-
sized businesses and small start-ups in manual trades have resisted these 
approaches. Action learning, therefore, only appears to ‘work’ for particular 
beneficiary groups, a problem exacerbated in the case evaluation by geographical 
variations, collectively hampering attempts to define categorically ‘what works’; 
perhaps conflicting with our own argument for process evaluation, yet still an 
observation far overlooked in current evidence-based policy and practice.  
 
These twin problems – a short-term strategy coupled with a multiplicity of competing 
interests at the implementation level – potentially gives rise to substantial problems 
for organisational learning.  Collective learning by policy-makers through evaluation 
may be thwarted by a failure to properly utilise evaluation data: 
 
(evaluation serves two main functions) enabling accountability and collective learning. Both of 
these - and their combination - run into diverse complications when applied in the complex 
multi-actor policy processes. (Van Der Meer and Edelenbos, 2006:201) 





At a policy-level, evaluations may actually have perverse effects on accountability, 
with a concentration on quantitative quick win outputs rather than substantive 
outcome-driven successes. There continues to be scope for a selective process of 
evaluation data whereby those datasets deemed measurable may not be required or 
even bear ‘little resemblance to what is relevant’ (Perrin,1999, cited in Davies, 
1999:155). Again, this was reflected in the case evaluation, this time at the 
national/central level. Whereas programme implementers at the local authority 
sought ongoing and reiterative learning from the evaluation there was a notable lack 
of interest from regional or national government offices. Formative interim findings of 
our evaluation, for example, were not responded to and instead there was repeated 
emphasis on quick-wins and evidence-gathering for accountability purposes. 
Stringent attempts to remain objective-based both whilst evaluating interventions, 
implementing policies and reviewing evidence post-implementation may hinder 
flexibility and lose sight of the grander picture of fostering economic prosperity 
amongst our case programme; we suggest that these attempts to foster objectivity, 
are in fact inflexible and unresponsive, and most ironically may lead to a lack of 
objectivity at a macro level. For this reason, this paper calls for holism, with a focus 
on the bigger picture rather than on objectives, proposals and bid promises made at 
the programme start and which may no longer require the type of interventions first 
discussed. 
 
A further observation within the case study was that uncertainty over policy direction 
led to frustration among internal stakeholders, as well as creating barriers in 
establishing clear evaluation goals. The potential complexity for this to change adds 




further speculation as to the purpose and potential changing purpose of the 
evaluation, with a deviation from original policy objectives not uncommon, and as 
Pollitt highlights: ‘the purpose of evaluation at policy-makers level may change with 
evaluation findings being overturned in favour of these new intentions’ (2003:114). 
The evaluation had to respond to shifts in both central policy and local ‘ad hoc’ 
implementation. For example, one of the programme’s initial local objectives was to 
develop certain specialist sectors, notably the chemical industry and renewable 
sector. Within 16-months of the programme being launched this objective was 
refined and the programme began actively pursuing the tourism sector. Clearly this 
impacted upon the evaluation; participants of the tourism strand were very much 
different to the chemical industry and renewable sector. Therefore the methodology 
had to undergo substantial redesign in terms of familiarisation with the sector and 
stakeholders and how success (or otherwise) could be measured in terms of 
performance indicators, etc.  
 
Further ambiguity was encountered though the paucity of central guidance over the 
relative importance evidence-based and accountability perspectives. Potentially, the 
data collected locally could contain no comparable, consistent or common indicators 
as a result of this guidance deficit. Schofield (2004:283) also addresses such policy 
and evaluation contentions highlighting ‘ambiguous policy guidance’ in a health 
service context. Taken together we suggest that this forms two distinct policy 








Competing approaches to evaluation: problem-inspired or problem-solving? 
 
The perceived disparity between what we term problem-inspired policy and problem-
solving policy resulted again in frustration by multiple stakeholders, triggered by 
ineffective and ill-informed policy formulation based upon the false premise that 
policy is founded upon a reliable evidence-base, and under the assumption that 
‘operationalizing such policy was doable’ (Schofield, 2004:284). 
 
Problem-inspired approaches refer to the reaction of policy makers who are inspired 
by the evaluation data and evidence of past programmes and social research and as 
a result initiate policies to redress these. We also suggest however that locally there 
is a better alignment on local needs, this approach we term a problem-solving 
approach.  
Approach:  Problem-Inspired Problem-Solving 
Characteristics: Predefined and decide among 
policy-makers 
Adhoc and responsive approach 
taken by policy-implementers – 
e.g. programme team 
Designed with best intention to 
meet socio-economic problems 
using an evidence-base (albeit 
flawed?) and generalised 
Interventions taken to observed 
socio-economic problems within a 




Fails to identify ‘what’ and ‘why’ an 
intervention succeeds (or fails)  
Qualitative evaluation which 
includes consideration of process 
and ‘how’ the programme/policy 
works 
Measured in accordance with 
national guidelines or to meet 
Difficult to measure due to 
extensive possibilities of 




local authority agreed indicators - 
quantitative 
interventions being implemented 
Fails to encourage qualitative 
evaluation 




The experiences and ad-hoc 
learning that a problem solving 
approach establishes never 
comes to light and so hinders 
learning 
Acceptance of such a response 
beneficial for future programme 
delivery 
Programme continues to be 
required to work off a quantitative 
evidence-base which fails to learn 
from previous process 
Can be used to develop future 
policies and programmes 
Figure 1: Problem-inspired and problem-solving approach overview 
 
The problem-inspired approach, taken by policy-makers and forced upon policy-
implementers, although well intended, frequently fails to understand what does (or 
does not) work and does little to encourage qualitative evaluation, which enables an 
understanding of pragmatic responses by programme teams and an appropriate use 
of evaluation findings in a timely and constructive manner. Local level implementers 
perceived as problem-solvers, adopting a pragmatic and responsive approach, so as 
to generate improvements that are context-specific. Although this is an 
understandable response, there is a strategic weakness in data conceptualisation, 
analysis and utilisation by policy-makers so that these real and pragmatic solutions 
to policy problems can be properly understood. 
 
The problem-inspired/problem-solving dichotomy can be used to legitimise this 
pragmatism and ad-hoc decision-making: policy-implementers consider there to be 




no choice but to react to unexpected pressures and events. As shown in the case 
study, there were many instances where informal and unplanned activity was 
undertaken with ensuing success, but due to the mainly quantitative reporting 
requirements of the government these ‘success factors’ will never be considered for 
future policy and programme formulation. 
 
The familiar debate regarding the capability of policy-implementers to translate these 
policy goals and apply policy (Barrett and Fudge, 1981; Brodkin, 1990), may also be 
relevant at this point. Although arguably the regulatory involvement of internal 
evaluation and performance teams act to bridge this gap: 
 
the institutionalization of evaluation has systematized evaluation commissioning and 
procurement, and installed skilled internal evaluation managers within many agencies who 
form a tier of interlocutors between evaluation and policy-makers and a channel for the 
involvement of many more policy interests in the evaluation process. (Stern, 2008:250) 
 
Both evaluators (in terms of the need to consider the following issue in 
methodological design) and policy-implementers (as local knowledge source) can 
face issues in terms of local diversity (mirroring theories in international business 
relating to local reflection and risks of ethnocentrism). A lack of knowledge of specific 
local variations, for example specific cultures, geographies, historical contexts by 
policy-makers or evaluators, and with it an over-generalised approach, could hinder 
the ability of the programme to meet its target beneficiaries and stakeholders. Our 
study found that both the evaluator and implementers needed to understand the 
historical context of the area and residents, on researching the area more the impact 
of mining and steel industry collapses were apparent: 





“It was interesting to discover that the old industries in the area provided plentiful work and 
the expectation that people would work in these companies on leaving school, the career path 
for people in the area particularly in the mining villages was essentially pre-made. On talking 
to X it seems that females filled the administrative roles and the males committed to manual 
tasks. Without the industries there is a) less alternative work without travelling, b) no preset 
career path, c) a dying expectation and I suppose peer pressure to work as many generations 
before did in those industries.” (Extract from field notes journal, 13th February 2008) 
 
We therefore maintain that regardless of where policy control and decision-making 
occurs, the importance of the experiences of implementers of policy at a local level 
(where subject/geographical/cultural specialism and familiarisation exists) is crucial. 
The ethnocentrism upheld by policy-implementers needs to give way to a more 
geocentric approach which appreciates the localism of target areas and gives 
programmes the ongoing discretion and flexibility to adjust their programme. Policy-
implementers, including programme staff, managers and specialists in the local 
policy field, arguably know more about the issues relevant to the areas that the 
policy is being applied, therefore can respond and align the programme to fit 
accordingly and therefore combined with this internal evaluation support are able to 
implement, measure and align delivery with policy far more closely. The bid process 
for the case programme allowed for such local factors to be considered and put 
forward by bidders, namely local authorities, although, it is 'often suggested that a 
policy has failed when the outcome deviates from the original policy regardless of 
whether the eventual outcome exceeded the initial problem that the policy or 
programme set about to redress (Schofield, 2004:283).  
 




Thus, we also suggest that generalisability may be an issue for consideration 
(Pawson and Tilley, 1997; Shaw, 1999; Sanderson, 2000). In suggesting so we must 
also highlight the difficulty for evaluation to provide data which reflects adequately 
the ‘real’ situation in that geography. The quantitative indicators specified by national 
government, call for generalisations and common measures to be reported – 
context-free of factors more fitting to that area such as history, or for the more 
responsive programme which may appear to miss its national targets but that 
addresses geocentrically the ‘real’ problems that matter at a local level to that 





Evaluation needs to be sensitive to these influences and the differences in 
perspective between policy-makers and policy-implementers. Fundamentally, policy 
designers and implementers are different and it is conceivable that neither entirely 
understand one another: 
  
It is unlikely that policy designers can anticipate the operational consequences of their 
initiatives because they are too far removed from operational management (Schofield, 
2004:284) 
 
Our case confirms that there is a great potential for influences, political or otherwise, 
to impinge on policy development and implementation, and echoes Stern’s call for 
evaluation to ensure familiarisation with 'policy debates and the world of policy-




makers' so as to attempt to influence and improve the current evaluation role in 
evidence-based policy and practice (2008:250). 
 
In local implementations, the evidence-base used by policy-makers cannot be taken 
as Gospel: evidence collection may have to be a fluid and flexible commodity, 
responding to the changing policy needs and ad-hoc delivery that programmes find 
themselves taking. Furthermore, the ambiguity at a policy level in terms of 
programme length, newer or complementing programmes (for the purpose of 
ensuring there is no replication) can hinder both an evaluator and programme with 
understandable frustrations on both parts.  
 
Although, we originally set about to judge the reliability of this evaluation evidence, 
on further thought and the development of our response this was found to judge the 
evaluation community on their efforts: 
 
There has been extensive soul-searching amongst the evaluation community about the 
perceived lack of impact evaluation research on the world of politics and practice (Sanderson, 
2000:435) 
 
It appears that the issue is more complex and contingent on effective policy practice 
and process, outside the direct responsibility of the evaluator.  
 
Under-utilisation of such evidence at a policy level, calls for quantitative rather than 
qualitative measurements, and the pragmatism practiced but perhaps not formalised 
by implementers at a local level restrict the potential for learning and refining 
programme delivery and policy design. Furthermore, we posit that policy is 




principally rhetoric and theoretically ideal; drawing upon evidence to ensure that well-
fitted solutions to the problems encountered are addressed satisfactorily, which does 
indeed sound perfect and a contrast to the observed reality of evaluation evidences ’ 
journey - improper, underused, and when used then with delay and thus allowing 
possible expiration risks.  
 
We would suggest that ours is not an isolated case. The contributions of others 
involved in local implementation and evaluation of economic regeneration and 
employment programmes also suggest that such issues are common (those we have 
exemplified include Sure Start, Health Action Zones and LEADER initiatives).    
 
To dismiss the use of evidence in policymaking entirely is asinine and foolish, for 
‘without soundly based analysis and modelling, those involved in the formulation of 
policy and the delivery of services will work in the dark’ (Cabinet Office, 2003). What 
is needed is more far-reaching approach to evaluation evidence, alongside a better 
utilisation strategy that considers the points we raise would assist in addressing 
many frictions.   As Keynes suggests ‘There is nothing a government hates more 
than to be well-informed; for it makes the process of arriving at decisions much more 
complicated and difficult’ (Keynes cited in Parsons, 1995:393) a wealth of evidence 
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